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BC’s 2016 ILLICIT DRUG OVERDOSE STATS RELEASED
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has announced the 2016 statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province. Last year there were  914 overdose deaths, almost an 80% increase over the same period in 2015. 
Moreover, the report attributes Fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the increase  in deaths. In December 2016 
alone, there were 142 deaths. This was the  highest recorded number of deaths occurring in a single month in 
BC and was more than double the monthly average number of illicit drug overdose deaths since 2015. 
People aged 30-39 were the hardest hit in 2016 with 252 illicit drug overdose deaths followed by 40-49 year-
olds at 216 deaths and 19-29 year-olds at 201 deaths. Vancouver had the most deaths at 215 followed by Surrey 
(108), Victoria (66), Kelowna (48) and Kamloops (40). 
The data also indicates that most illicit drug overdoses occur inside (90%) while 9% occurred outside, including 
vehicles, streets, sidewalks, parking lots, parks, wooded areas and campgrounds. For the remaining eight 
deaths, the place of death was unknown. 
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This year - 2017 - is off to a rough start as 
well. In January there were 116 overdose 
deaths. This is a 36.5% increase over the 
number of deaths in January 2016. That’s 
more than three people dying every day.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
see 
pages  
39-40
Westin Bayshore, Vancouver, BC
See page 21
Leadership Through Crisis
Note-able Quote
“Our greatest glory is not in never falling,
but in getting up every time we do.” - 
Confucious
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
7 steps to a comprehensive literature review: a 
multimodal & cultural approach.
Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie & Rebecca Frels.
London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2016.
LB 1047.3 O59 2016
Aboriginal law.
Thomas Isaac.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2016.
KE 7709 I823 2016
Communicating risk.
edited by Jonathan Crichton, Christopher N. Candlin, 
& Arthur S. Firkins. 
Houndmills Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
T 10.68 C636 2016
The craft of research.
Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. 
Williams, Joseph Bizup & William T. FitzGerald.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Q 180.55 M4 B66 2016
Cure back pain: 80 personalized easy exercises 
for spinal training to improve posture, eliminate 
tension & reduce stress.
Jean-François Harvey, BSc, DO.
Toronto, ON: Robert Rose, 2016. 
RD 771 B217 H38 2016
Deep work.
Cal Newport.
London, UK: Piatkus, 2016.
BF 323 D5 N49 2016
 
Determinants of indigenous peoples' health in 
Canada: beyond the social.
Edited by Margo Greenwood, Sarah de Leeuw, 
Nicole Marie Lindsay & Charlotte Reading.
Toronto, ON: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2015.
RA 450.4 I53 D48 2015
Facilitating learning with the adult brain in mind: 
a conceptual and practical guide.
Kathleen Taylor & Catherine Marienau.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2016.
LC 5225 L42 T4 2016
The greats on leadership: classic wisdom for 
modern managers.
Jocelyn Davis.
London, UK; Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2016.
HD 57.7 D385 2016
Invisible influence: the hidden forces that shape 
behaviour.
Jonah Berger.
London, UK: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2016.
HM 1176 B47 2016
Michael Allen's guide to e-learning: building 
interactive, fun, and effective learning programs 
for any company.
Michael W. Allen.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 A468 2016
Study smarter, not harder.
Kevin Paul, MA.
North Vancouver, BC: Self-Counsel Press, 2014.
LB 1049 P37 2014
Weapons of math destruction: how big data 
increases inequality and threatens democracy.
Cathy O'Neil.
London, UK: Allen Lane, 2016.
QA 76.9 B45 O64 2016
What color is your parachute?: a practical 
manual for job-hunters and career-changers.
Richard N. Bolles.
Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press, 2017.
HF 5383 B56 2017 
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IMPRACTICABILITY TO APPEAR 
IN PERSON NOT THE SAME AS 
URGENCY IN GETTING 
WARRANT
R. v. Clark, 2017 SCC 3
A police officer completed an ITO and 
a telewarrant application at 2:00 am to 
investigate theft of electricity  at a 
residence. The officer was seeking a 
warrant to search “by day.” In the 
application, the officer stated he was using the 
telewarrant procedure as it was impracticable for 
him to appear personally before a justice  because 
he was working a nightshift and the courthouse was 
presently  closed. After leaving a message through 
British Columbia’s Justice Centre phone line, the 
officer received a  call from a Judicial Justice of the 
Peace (JJP) at 2:10 am asking him why the 
application could not be made in person during  the 
day at the courthouse. He provided several points 
and the JJP suggested those reasons be set out in the 
ITO. The officer changed his ITO and faxed the 
revised application to the JJP at 2:35 am. 
At 3:07 am the officer received a signed telewarrant 
authorizing him (and other officers) to enter the 
residence between 2:00 pm and 6:00 pm to search 
for evidence of electricity theft. When the police 
executed the warrant, they not only  found an 
electrical by-pass but also a large marihuana grow-
operation. The police seized 707 marihuana plants, 
grow-operation equipment, evidence of a bypass, 
$500 cash and two gold rings believed to be 
offence-related property. The accused was found 
inside the home at the time the warrant was 
executed. He was charged with producing 
marihuana, possessing marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking, and theft of electricity. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused suggested that the warrant 
was invalid, in part, because the JJP had 
acted inappropriately by providing 
advice to the officer in the preparation 
of the ITO.  The judge agreed, finding the JJP was 
not acting judicially when he guided the officer in 
the telewarrant application and that he was 
predisposed to grant the application he had not yet 
seen. The judge excised the  paragraph from the ITO 
that addressed the impracticability of an in-person 
application. Without this, the  impracticability 
requirement of the  telewarrant provision had not 
been satisfied. The warrant was quashed and the 
search of the residence  amounted to a warrantless 
one. The accused’s s. 8 Charter rights had been 
breached and the evidence of the drugs and other 
items was excluded under s. 24(2). The accused 
was acquitted of all charges. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown suggested, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
when he found that the JJP gave 
improper assistance to the 
officer submitting the telewarrant. 
Judicial Independence & Impartiality
Justice Frankel, speaking for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal, found the trial judge’s inference that the 
JJP was predisposed to grant the warrant even 
before he saw it was neither reasonable nor logical. 
In some cases, “it is permissible for a judicial 
justice to provide some advice and/or direction to 
an officer applying for a warrant,” said Justice 
Frankel. “The inquiry [the JJP] made of [the officer]
—in effect, ‘why can’t this wait until normal office 
hours’—is something any judicial justice  or judge 
likely would ask at that time of day. ... He did no 
more than advise [the officer] fully set out his 
reasons for using the telewarrant procedure.”
TELEWARRANT
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Impracticability
The accused suggested that the impracticability 
requirement of appearing in person was not 
satisfied even if the paragraph explaining why the 
officer did not appear before a JJP was considered. 
In his opinion, there was no urgency for obtaining  a 
warrant in the early morning hours and there was 
no explanation from the officer why he could not 
wait until the courthouse opened later that day. But 
Justice Frankel rejected this submission. The ITO 
need only support a basis why an in-person 
application was not practicable. It was not 
necessary  to also show that urgency was a factor 
such that there was an immediate need for a 
warrant:
The telewarrant procedure was designed to 
make it possible for law enforcement officers to 
apply for a search warrant 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. Whether the application is 
made in-person or by fax the reasonable-
grounds standard must be met before a warrant 
can be issued. The impracticability-requirement 
is concerned with whether it is practicable to 
make an in-person application at the time the 
application is brought; it does not require that 
an immediate need for a warrant be 
demonstrated. [para. 66]
In th i s case , the pa rag raph addres s ing 
impracticability could have satisfied a JJP that the 
ITO disclosed “reasonable  grounds for dispensing 
with an information presented personally  and in 
writing” as would the statement printed on the form 
that said the local courthouse was presently closed. 
The Court of Appeal concluded the telewarrant was 
properly issued. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the accused’s acquittals set aside and a new trial 
ordered. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused  argued, 
among other things, 
that the JJP lost his 
independence and 
impartiality when he 
provided guidance to 
the investigating officer, and that it wasn’t 
impracticable for the officer to appear in person. 
However, a unanimous Supreme Court sitting all 
nine justices, in a very short judgment, dismissed 
the accused’s appeal substantially for the reasons 
provided by the Court of Appeal. The decision 
reversing the trial judge and ordering a new trial 
was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Clark, 2015 BCCA 488.
FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INFORMER’s IDENTITY RESULTS 
IN LARGE DAMAGE AWARD
Nissen v. Durham Regional Police Services 
Board, 2017 ONCA 10
The plaintiff, Ms. Stack, lived with 
her husband (Mr. Nissen) and their 
two children. She learned from a 
neighbour that the teenage son of a 
different neighbour had broke into a 
home, stole guns, and (with his brother) took the 
guns to school and threatened students. Ms. Stack 
said she decided to tell the police but she did not 
want her name associated with any investigation. 
She claimed she subsequently spoke to a police 
officer over the phone and insisted she not be 
identified and that she was afraid of the  teenage 
neighbour and his brother. She asserted the officer 
promised her that her identity would not be 
disclosed and, if she came to the police station to 
discuss the matter, her identity would be kept secret 
and that she would remain totally anonymous. 
“The impracticability-requirement is 
concerned with whether it is practicable 
to make an in-person application at the 
time the application is brought; it does 
not require that an immediate need for a 
warrant be demonstrated.”
Sign up for In-Service: 10-8 by clicking 
here
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At the police station, unbeknownst to Ms. Stack, 
her police interview was recorded on videotape. 
Within a few days of her interview the boys were 
arrested and her identity  and her videotaped 
interview were included in the Crown’s disclosure 
package. This disclosure provoked an angry 
reaction from the boys’ parents. Their father drove 
his truck at Ms. Stack causing her to leap from the 
sidewalk and further threatening and harassing 
conduct occurred against Ms. Stack and her family. 
This on-going harassment became unbearable and 
Ms. Stack and her family ultimately  decided to sell 
their home and move to another community. Ms. 
Stack and Mr. Nissen sued the police and several 
named officers for breaching informer privilege. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the police 
officer had promised Ms. Stack 
anonymity and confidentiality despite 
police denials that such confidentiality 
was promised or that she enjoyed the status of a 
confidential informer. “On a balance of 
probabilities, I hold that [the officer] promised Ms. 
Stack that her identity would be preserved, and not 
disclosed, if she came to the police  station and 
provided information about suspected criminal 
activity,” said the judge. “He did not qualify that 
promise in any way. Thus, both expressly and by 
implication Ms. Stack became entitled to informer 
privilege, that is, she was entitled to have her 
anonymity preserved with respect to her 
involvement in conveying information to the 
police.” The judge found the police owed a 
common law duty not to disclose the identity of an 
informer and they had not taken reasonable care in 
this case. 
The judge then went on to award Ms. Stack 
$345,000 in general damages for emotional and 
psychological injury. She had complained of 
feeling hopeless and depressed following these 
events, and she had been diagnosed with post- 
traumatic stress disorder. Her family, friends and a 
psychiatrist had testified about the significant 
change in her behaviour and enjoyment in her life. 
The judge also awarded $65,000 in Ontario Family 
Law Act damages for loss of guidance, care and 
companionship to Mr. Nissen. A sum of $25,000 
was also awarded to each child. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The pol ice  (de fendants ) 
appealed arguing, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in finding 
that Ms. Stack was promised 
confidentiality and in finding that she had 
established the necessary  elements for such a 
claim. 
Promise of Confidentiality 
The police argued that the 
officer would not have 
asked Ms. Stack to come 
to the police station for an 
interview if she was being 
treated as a confidential 
informer. This submission, 
however, was rejected. 
The trial judge’s finding 
that the officer promised Ms. Stack confidentiality 
and anonymity was based on a thorough review of 
the evidence and was supported, among other 
evidence, by the conversation between the officer 
and Ms. Stack at the conclusion of the  videotaped 
statement. Even though the officer never used the 
term “confidential informer”, when Ms. Stack asked 
the officer not to let anyone know about their 
conversation he said, “[T]his is between you and 
I. Of course, I have to keep records of this for 
ourselves...That stuff does not get disclosed. It is 
not made available to the public. You don’t have 
to worry about that.” 
Elements of Claim 
The police argued that not only did the plaintiff 
need to prove  a promise of confidentiality in 
exchange for information, but that they also needed 
to establish that the information provided was 
difficult or impossible to obtain, and the informer 
was likely to suffer harm or danger if their identity 
were disclosed. However, Justice Sharpe, speaking 
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for the Court of Appeal, determined that the 
elements required for a claim of damages against 
the police for breaching a promise they made of 
confidentiality  to a citizen reporting criminal 
wrongdoing was the same as the civil law action 
for breach of confidence. He refused to add the 
additional elements as suggested by the police in 
establishing a civil claim for damages. In this case, 
the officer made a promise  of confidentiality and 
anonymity to Ms. Stack in exchange for the 
information she provided, the promise was 
breached and Ms. Stack suffered damages as a 
result. Justice Sharpe wrote: 
While other considerations may come into play 
in a criminal case where the prosecution is 
resisting disclosure of the identity of a 
confidential informer to an accused, this is a 
civil case between the police and an individual 
who was promised confidentiality. That promise 
gave rise to a common law and equitable right 
entitling Ms. Stack to have her identity kept 
confidential. Her right was not contingent upon 
other ways the Police may have had to get the 
information she provided, or on what the Police 
thought about the danger she faced. [para. 33] 
In terms of police offering a promise of 
confidentiality, the Court of Appeal stated: 
It is, of course, for the police to decide whether 
or not to make a promise of confidentiality. In 
making that decision, they will no doubt make 
an assessment of the value of the information 
the witness may have to offer, whether they can 
get the information through other means, and 
the danger the witness may face if his or her 
identity is revealed. If the police tell the witness 
that they will not reveal his or her identity or 
involvement in order to get information, they 
should keep their promise, or face the ordinary 
consequences of violating the assurance they 
have given. If the police decide that the witness 
does not deserve or warrant the requested 
assurance of confidentiality and anonymity, 
they should clearly say so and refuse to give the 
witness the requested assurance. That would 
allow the witness to decide whether to 
nonetheless give the information and accept 
the risk of disclosure. Simply put, a citizen in 
Ms. Stack’s situation should be able to rely 
upon what the police tell her. [para. 35] 
The defendants’ appeal was dismissed and the 
awarding of damages upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“It is, of course, for the police to decide whether or not to make a promise of 
confidentiality. ... If the police tell the witness that they will not reveal his or her identity 
or involvement in order to get information, they should keep their promise, or face the 
ordinary consequences of violating the assurance they have given. If the police decide 
that the witness does not deserve or warrant the requested assurance of 
confidentiality and anonymity, they should clearly say so and refuse to give the witness 
the requested assurance.”
        BULLET POINTS
Breaching Informer Privilege
A claim for damages for breaching 
informer privilege requires:
• A promise of confidentiality;
• Breach of the promise; and
• Damages. 
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NO DETENTION, 
NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. O'Leary, 2017 ONCA 71 
A man lost control of his vehicle, 
swerved into the oncoming lane and 
struck a  van. The man was killed and 
the van’s driver was seriously injured. 
A police press release indicated they 
were looking for the driver of a light coloured 
vehicle seen in the vicinity and travelling in the 
same direction as the deceased. The accused heard 
a radio broadcast of the press release and went to 
the police station to speak with officers. A detective 
interviewed the accused from 8:20 am to 9:25 am, 
some 65 minutes including breaks. 
Prior to the interview, the detective  read the 
accused his right to counsel and other warnings. 
The accused said that he did not have a lawyer. The 
detective immediately told him about the number 
for legal aid and repeated the offer of a lawyer. The 
accused said nothing more to indicate he wanted to 
contact counsel. An interview then occurred in a 
small room. The officer exaggerated the speeds of 
the other vehicles and referred to a non-existent 
video. The accused admitted he was racing  the 
deceased’s vehicle along a  stretch of road a short 
distance from the accident scene. Following the 
interview, the accused was allowed to leave. He 
was not arrested or charged at the time. The 
Crown’s theory was that the accused was racing 
when the deceased lost control of his motor vehicle 
and collided with the oncoming van. The accused 
was charged with dangerous driving causing death 
and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused submitted, in part, that his 
right to silence under s. 7 and his right 
to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter 
had been breached and that his 
statement was not voluntary. In his opinion, he was 
detained shortly after the interview began. And 
even though his s. 10(b) right was read to him, 
along with the cautions, there was never any clear 
and unequivocal waiver of it. He wanted his 
statement ruled inadmissible on several grounds, 
including s. 24(2) of the Charter and the common 
law confessions rule. 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the 
accused’s statement was admissible. In its view, the 
accused was not detained. The Crown argued that 
the concept of detention does not include every 
instance where the police have grounds to arrest 
someone but choose to hold off and question the 
individual or elicit evidence in some other manner. 
Moreover, the Crown suggested that the statement 
was voluntary. 
Detention
In looking at whether or not a  psychological 
detention occurs, the judge stated:
There is no exhaustive list of ingredients for the 
recipe of psychological detention. A judge may 
consider, first, the circumstances which 
precipitated the encounter between the police 
officer and the suspect. For example, were the 
police making general inquiries or were they 
singling out this accused for focussed 
investigation of a specific event?  Second, a 
judge may consider the nature of the police 
conduct. For example, where did the interview 
occur? For how long? How did the suspect get 
there? Was anyone else present? Third, a judge 
may consider the particular characteristics of 
the accused – his age, size, minority status and 
level of sophistication, as examples.
What The Police Press Release Said
““Grey County OPP continues to investigate 
the fatal motor vehicle collision which 
occurred at approximately 10:15 p.m. last 
night…Police have obtained video depicting a 
light coloured vehicle travelling with the 
deceased’s vehicle just prior to and after the 
collision. Police would like to speak with the 
person operating this vehicle or anyone who 
may have any information regarding the driver 
and or the vehicle in question”.
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DETENTION FACTOR GRID
Factors Favouring a 
Finding of Detention
Factors Favouring a 
Finding of No Detention
Neutral Factors
The detective, shorty into the 
interview, had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused 
for dangerous driving.
The detective testified he never intended or actually 
did detain the accused.
Nature of  the questions. Although 
started with general inquiries and 
moved to more focussed questions, the 
detective was professional. The 
questioning was not aggressive.
The detective never touched or restrained the 
accused, nor did he physically direct his movements. 
The accused testified he felt he 
could not leave the interview 
room.
The nature and tone of  the interview was fairly calm 
and non-confrontational. The detective did not stand 
over the accused in the interview room, did not shout 
at him, did not get visibly angry with him nor berate 
him.  
The officer gave the accused the right 
to counsel almost immediately followed 
by the detective telling him that he was 
not in custody and could get up and 
walk out.  The detective clarified that 
the accused “may” be charged with 
certain offences.
The place of  the interview was a 
small room with the door closed.
The detective told the accused he was not in custody 
and could leave at any time. 
The accused’s personal characteristics. 
He was a young adult, average 
sophistication, not much smaller than 
the detective and was not a minority.
The detective told the accused he could get up and 
walk out if  he wanted.
The accused arrived at the police station on his own, 
unannounced. He drove himself  and was not asked 
or expected to attend. He did not ask for the 
interview to be done over the telephone or take 
place somewhere else.  He met the detective in the 
lobby and then followed the officer in to the interview 
room.
Instances of  the detective telling the 
accused to “sit for a second” were 
made in a friendly tone and in the 
context of  the detective doing 
something in the absence of  the 
accused, such as photocopying outside 
of  the interview room. It was a figure of 
speech and not a command.
The accused was texting on his cellphone while the 
detective was out of  the room. The accused felt 
comfortable enough to take out his phone, in plain 
view, and text, multiple times and at length.
Length of  the interview. It was not very 
brief  nor was it long.
The detective never seized anything from the 
accused.
The accused walked out of  the interview and drove 
away on his own.
                                                      Factors taken from R v. O’Leary, 2015 ONSC 1346
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In this case, the judge found the accused had not 
met the burden of proving on a balance of 
probabilities that he had been detained when 
interviewed. The accused was not physically 
detained and he had no legal obligation to comply 
with a police demand or to answer the detective’s 
questions. Nor would any reasonable person in his 
shoes have felt psychologically detained at any 
point before, during or after the interview. (see 
detention factor grid).  
Since the accused was not detained, his right to 
counsel was not breached. And, even if he was 
entitled to the right to counsel, he waived that right. 
Right to Silence
The judge found the accused’s right to silence 
under s. 7 of the Charter had not been breached 
whether he was detained or not:
He never expressed or implied, during the 
interview, that he did not want to speak.  That is 
because he wanted to talk.  He wanted to 
answer the questions. He wanted to tell his side 
of the story. He wanted to correct the officer’s 
misapprehensions.   He did not want to remain 
silent, which is why he never asserted that 
right. 
Voluntariness
The Crown has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a person’s statement to the 
police was voluntary. If a  statement is not voluntary, 
it is not admissible as evidence at trial. “The 
rationale for the confessions rule  is that involuntary 
confessions are more  likely to be unreliable,” said 
the judge. “The rule  protects the rights of the 
accused while not unduly  limiting society’s need to 
investigate and solve crime.” Factors a judge will 
consider in determining voluntariness include 
evidence of threats,  promises and/or inducements, 
oppression, the operating mind requirement and 
police trickery. However, “not every threat, promise 
or inducement wil l render a confession 
involuntary.” 
In this case, the judge found the accused’s 
statement to be voluntary. He had an operating 
mind and there were no threats or promises made, 
nor any oppression. As for the detectives references 
to “conscience” and “family”, these were not 
improper inducements.  “These are the types of 
alleged moral or spiritual inducements that will 
rarely give rise to a finding of involuntariness,” said 
the judge. “[The detective] had no control over [the 
accused’s] conscience or his sense of family.  There 
was no quid pro quo.” As for police trickery, there 
was none:
It is one thing for a police officer to exaggerate 
the strength of the evidence against the 
accused;  it is another thing for the officer to 
ALLEGED INDUCEMENT
DETECTIVE: But you wanted to be found, just 
because your conscience, and I appreciate that, and I 
knew that was gonna happen.  I bet on it last night 
that somebody, whoever it was, is gonna realize the 
mistake that was made that cost a person his life, 
and come in here.  And we have another guy heading 
for London for surgery.  The guy in the van, okay?  
He’s, it’s not life threatening, but he’s got to have 
surgery on his foot and his hand, okay?  And I don’t 
know if you know who that guy is?
ACCUSED: He works at Springmount.
DETECTIVE:  Yeah. So, and it’s probably some place 
where you stop and get gas once in a while…
ACCUSED:  Every morning, yeah.
DETECTIVE:   …yeah.  Yeah.  So we have, it’s like a 
family kind of thing we’ve got goin’ on here.  This isn’t 
people from Toronto that were involved in this.
ACCUSED:  Yeah.
DETECTIVE:  These are all Owen Sound people.
ACCUSED:  Mhm.
DETECTIVE:  And we’ve got to make it right, okay?  
And like I say, that’s why I appreciate you coming in. 
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fabricate out of left-field evidence which simply 
does not exist.
Here, the most that the Defence can point to 
are items like [the detective] exaggerating the 
speeds of the two motor vehicles and referring 
to a video that, as it turns out, does not 
exist. These are not the types of police trickery 
that render an otherwise conversational 
statement legally inadmissible as involuntary.
The Crown had proven, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the accused’s statement was voluntary.
The accused was convicted of dangerous driving 
while racing causing bodily harm, and one count of 
dangerous driving while racing causing death.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions suggesting, among 
other things, that his statement 
was inadmissible. The Court of 
Appeal, however, rejected this submission. First, the 
trial judge properly applied the law in finding that 
the accused was not detained when he gave his 
statement to the police.  “In the absence of a 
detention, neither s. 10(b) of the Charter, nor the 
right to silence as guaranteed in s. 7 of the Charter, 
are engaged,” said the Court of Appeal. As for the 
voluntariness inquiry, the trial judge correctly 
concluded that the  officer did not induce the 
statement by inviting  the accused, as a member of 
the local community, to do the responsible thing 
and tell the police what he knew.  There was no 
improper inducement by the police and no 
oppression. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
O’Leary, 2015 ONSC 1346.
CRIMINAL STANDARD OF 
PROOF TO BE APPLIED TO 
EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE
R. v. McKay, 2017 SKCA 4
Two men entered a convenience 
store and one of them demanded 
cigarettes from the clerk, saying “Do 
you want a  knife  on your throat?” as 
he put his hand in his pocket. This 
man was wearing a light-coloured mask with black 
detail and a dark jacket with fur trim, a baseball 
cap, a dark sweatshirt with a Starter logo, a blue 
shirt with a neon green or yellow stripe, and a pair 
of dark sweatpants, also emblazoned with a  Starter 
logo on the  left leg. The incident was captured on 
the store’s video surveillance system. 
About 43 minutes after the robbery  two individuals, 
including the accused, were detained by the police 
about two blocks from the convenience store. 
When detained, the accused was wearing a dark 
sweatshirt and sweatpants, both with a Starter logo, 
a blue shirt with a neon green or yellow stripe, and 
a light-coloured baseball cap. The other person was 
wearing a dark jacket with fur trim, jeans, a 
Chicago Bulls baseball cap, and a white bandana 
with black markings. Police took photographs of 
the two suspects during their detention, but 
released them because  the convenience store 
surveillance video had not yet been reviewed. 
Three days later the accused, wearing a white 
baseball cap and a  dark sweatshirt with a Starter 
logo, and the other person were arrested. The 
accused was charged with robbery.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge compared the similarity in 
clothing  worn by the masked man and 
the other person as shown in the 
surveillance video with the clothing 
worn by the two people stopped by police, as 
evidenced by the photographs taken at that time of 
their detention. After considering the clothing 
piece-by-piece the judge decided that, although 
similar, he could not conclude the clothing was 
“In the absence of a detention, neither 
s. 10(b) of the Charter, nor the right to 
silence as guaranteed in s. 7 of the 
Charter, are engaged.”
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one in the same. Although he had “very serious 
suspicions” that the  accused and the masked man 
at the robbery were the same person, he was not 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused 
was acquitted of the robbery charge. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittal arguing the 
trial judge erred by applying 
the criminal standard of proof 
to individual pieces of evidence and by failing to 
consider the evidence as a whole.
Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
“It is well established that it is an error in law to 
subject individual pieces of evidence to the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable  doubt,” 
noted Justice Whitmore, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal. “It is also settled that trial judges are 
obligated to consider the cumulative effect of all 
relevant evidence as a whole.”
In this case, the trial judge erred by applying the 
criminal standard of proof to individual pieces of 
evidence. Rather than applying the criminal 
standard of proof at the verdict stage, he applied it 
to the fact-finding stage when he referred to each 
piece of clothing worn by the masked man in the 
convenience store surveillance video and 
compared it to the clothing as seen in the 
photographs taken by police a short time after the 
robbery. Justice Whitmore stated: 
The trial judge considered the clothing piece-
by-piece and seemingly discarded the evidence 
once he decided he could not conclusively 
determine that the pieces of clothing were the 
same. In doing so, he applied the criminal 
standard of proof to individual pieces of 
evidence. He thereby committed an error … 
[para. 17]
Furthermore, the trial judge failed to weigh all of 
the evidence as a whole in determining the 
accused’s guilt or innocence: 
The trial judge considered the pieces of 
evidence separately and determined that 
nothing definitive could be concluded from 
each piece. He then failed to consider the 
evidence together, even though each piece of 
evidence remained capable of supporting the 
other items of evidence and strengthening the 
inference that the [accused] was the masked 
perpetrator. In taking this approach, the trial 
judge did not consider the evidence as a whole 
and thereby potentially discounted evidence 
with respect to the [accused’s] clothing that 
should have been considered in conjunction 
with the rest of the evidence in his analysis. 
[paras. 23]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittal was 
set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“What lies behind you and what lies before you 
pales in comparison to what lies within you.” - 
Ralph Waldo Emerson
“It is well established that it is an error in law to subject individual pieces of evidence to 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also settled that trial judges are 
obligated to consider the cumulative effect of all relevant evidence as a whole.”
vs.
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THIRD-PARTY CHARTER 
BREACHES CONSIDERED IN     
s. 24(2) ANALYSIS
R. v. Mauro, 2017 BCCA 45
The accused was the driver of a car 
involved in a collision with another 
vehicle. His car was significantly 
damaged and a  passenger in the 
other vehicle was injured. Following 
the collision, the accused telephoned his mother 
and asked her to drive to the accident scene. Before 
her arrival, he  took a plastic bag from the passenger 
seat of his vehicle  and held it until his mother 
arrival. He made no enquiries into whether the 
occupants of the other vehicle were  injured. When 
his mother arrived, she  was driving a car registered 
in the accused’s name and he put the plastic bag 
and its contents into it. A witness thought this 
behaviour was odd and took a photograph of the 
accused. When the police arrived on the scene they 
were advised of what had been seen and their 
suspicions were aroused. The accused’s mother was 
questioned about the  bag and, upon being pressed 
to do so, she  handed it to one of the investigating 
officers. When the bag was opened, it was found to 
contain about 1.3 kgs. of cocaine. Both the 
accused and his mother were arrested.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused challenged the  lawfulness 
of the search and seizure under s. 8 of 
the Charter.  The judge found the 
arresting officer made a warrantless 
search of the accused’s property by asking his 
mother to produce the bag for inspection, and inn 
opening  it. The  arresting officer had bypassed the 
owner of the bag in order to obtain and examine it, 
knowing the accused had an interest in it, without a 
warrant and without cause to conduct a search. The 
accused’s Charter rights had been breached by this 
warrantless search as there were no grounds to 
conduct a search incidental to a lawful detention or 
incidental to a lawful arrest at the scene of the 
accident. 
Despite  this finding, the judge nevertheless 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
In doing so, he only considered the conduct of the 
police in relation to the accused and not in their 
dealings with his mother. In the judge’s view, it 
would be improper for the accused to invoke 
alleged breaches of his mother’s Charter rights for 
any purpose including the purpose of seeking to 
have the cocaine excluded. The accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other grounds, that the trial 
judge failed to weigh the 
conduct of the arresting officer 
in relation to the accused’s mother when 
considering the seriousness of the Charter breach. 
The Crown acknowledged that the accused’s 
mother was unlawfully detained and her ss.  10(a) 
and 10(b) rights were breached when the arresting 
officer failed to inform her of the reasons for her 
detention or about her right to counsel. As well, the 
Crown acknowledged that the trial judge erred in 
failing to weigh the breach of the accused’s 
mother’s rights in relation to both the assessment of 
the seriousness of his Charter breach and whether 
the admission of the  evidence could bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
Despite this error made by the trial judge, the Court 
of Appeal nevertheless concluded that the evidence 
should not have been excluded even when 
considering the significance of his mother’s (a third 
party) Charter breaches. Although the seriousness 
of the Charter-infringing state conduct was more 
significant when taking into account the breach of 
the mother’s rights, the findings in relation to the 
accused’s mother’s detention did not tip the 
analysis in favour of exclusion:
• Although she was “psychologically detained”, 
she chose to engage with the officer in 
conversation on the subject of his inquiries;
• The arresting officer reasonably believed she 
gave him an untruthful answer to a question 
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posed in the course of the criminal 
investigation;
• When pressed her for a truthful answer she 
handed the bag to him;
• She had ostensible authority  to deal with the 
officer in connection with the bag – an 
authority confirmed by her advice that the 
vehicle into which the bag had been placed 
was “her car” and by handing the bag over;
• In the circumstances, the officer made a 
reasonable mistake of fact as to who had 
authority to give him the bag;
• The officer did not intentionally seek to “end 
run” the accused by dealing with his mother;
• There was no coercion or excessive use of 
psychological force.
“It should be borne in mind that [the officer] was 
dealing with [the mother] as a witness to the 
offence and not as a  suspect,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “In short, he did not believe  he was 
detaining her. That, rather than bad faith, caused 
him to fail to inform her of the reasons for her 
detention and her right to counsel.” The cocaine 
was admissible and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
TRAFFIC STOP VALID DESPITE 
DUAL PURPOSE 
R. v. Nguyen, 2017 BCSC 105 
A patrol officer was asked by a drug 
investigator to stop a  specific vehicle 
and identify its driver. The patrol 
officer found the vehicle within 30 
seconds of the request and followed 
it. The officer saw the vehicle twice overlap the 
adjacent lane  from the  curb lane without signalling. 
The officer then stopped the vehicle, approached 
the driver’s side window and only advised the 
accused that he had pulled him over for 
overlapping into the adjacent lane. He was not told 
that the  officer had been requested by a drug 
investigator to pull him over to obtain his identity. 
On request, the accused provided his driver’s 
license. He was polite, cooperative, appeared sober 
and said he would be more careful in the future. 
No ticket was issued. Within two hours of the traffic 
stop, the officer sent an email to the drug 
investigator detailing the stop. This information was 
then used in an Information to Obtain (ITO) a 
search warrant. The accused was subsequently 
charged with conspiring to export and conspiracy 
to produce methamphetamine, and with three 
firearms/prohibited device offences.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The officer testified that he knew he 
needed grounds to stop the vehicle. He 
said he initiated a stop of the vehicle for 
a dual purpose:
 
1. To check the sobriety  of the driver. The officer 
considered he had grounds to stop the vehicle 
under ss. 151(a) and (c) of BC’s Motor Vehicle 
Act (MVA), which makes it an offence for the 
driver of a vehicle to change lanes unsafely 
and without signalling; and 
2. To obtain the identity of the driver pursuant to 
the request from the drug investigator.
The accused argued that the  police breached his 
Charter rights under ss. 9 and 10. In his view, the 
traffic stop for an MVA offence was a  ruse and the 
real reason for the stop was to identity of the driver 
at the request of the drug investigator. In support of 
his position, the accused noted the following: 
• the request made by the drug investigator to 
stop the vehicle; 
• the tenuous connection between the driving 
observed and the MVA offences cited; 
• the fact that no ticket was issued; 
• the close relationship between the time of the 
traffic stop and the subsequent e-mail sent to 
the drug investigator. 
The accused wanted any information or evidence 
obtained by the officer from the accused during  the 
traffic stop excluded under s. 24(2).
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The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
traffic stop was valid because it was based on 
observed MVA offences. As well, while the patrol 
officer may have had a primary motivation to stop 
the vehicle to identify its driver, he would not have 
done so absent observing a driving offence. 
Dual Purpose Stop
In this case, Justice Greyell ruled that the officer 
acted appropriately when he stopped the accused 
for driving offences under the MVA and thereby 
obtained his identity:
In  the present case [the officer] testified he knew he 
needed a reason to initiate a motor vehicle stop 
other than a request from drug section  investigators 
to  stop the vehicle and ascertain the identity of the 
driver. That is, he was aware he needed to observe 
some driving or MVA infraction before stopping the 
vehicle. He testified he observed the driver cross 
the line demarking the adjacent lane several times. 
He testified he was also concerned with the 
sobriety of the driver. [para. 22]
And further:
When [the officer] approached  the driver he 
explained the reason he had been pulled over. 
The driver did not voice objection but rather, 
explained his driving behavior as resulting from 
his unfamiliarity with driving a large vehicle. 
While the officer did not issue a ticket, this fact in 
my view does not mean the traffic stop under the 
MVA was simply a ruse to  detain [the accused] to 
obtain his identity. [para. 24]
Since the  officer had a legitimate traffic  related 
reason to stop the vehicle, the fact he wanted to 
use the information of the accused’s identity for 
intelligence purposes did not render the stop 
unlawful. There  were no breaches of the accused’s 
ss. 9, 10(a) or 10(b) rights. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
What the email said (in part)
As the vehicle continued to drive it overlapped into the #2 lane twice, 
contrary to the Motor Vehicle Act and a traffic stop was conducted to 
access the sobriety of the driver.
The driver and lone occupant was advised of the reason for the stop, 
he was polite, apologized and advised it was probably because he 
was driving a large truck.
The driver when asked produced BCDL which identified him as 
Quang Dong NGUYEN, DOB 1973-09-18, of Vancouver. Constable 
KHALIF was satisfied with his identification.
NGUYEN advised the truck belonged to his uncle and that he was in 
Surrey visiting friends. A shaker cup with brown liquid was noted in 
the center console along with a coffee cup and NGUYEN advised it 
contained protein and that he was working out. NGUYEN also stated 
he was on the way to Church’s Chicken prior to the traffic stop.
…
Identification and insurance was returned to NGUYEN he was 
advised to be more careful when driving, as to not get side swiped.
NGUYEN when asked stated he understood and did not have any 
questions for police.
- Of note the second time police came back to the vehicle to return 
BCDL and Insurance NGUYEN had Asian music blaring showing that 
he was not too concerned with the traffic stop, he also did not appear 
nervous or paranoid during police interaction with him.
NGUYEN was then allowed to proceed. 
What the ITO said (in part)
As the grey Tundra continued to drive it overlapped into the middle 
lane twice, contrary to the Motor Vehicle Act and a traffic stop was 
conducted to assess the sobriety of the driver. The driver and lone 
occupant was advised of the reason for the stop, he was polite, 
apologized and advised it was probably because he was driving a 
large truck. The driver when asked produced a drivers license which 
identified him as Quang Dong NGUYEN, born September 18, 1973, 
of Vancouver. Cst. KHALIF was satisfied with his identification. 
NGUYEN advised the truck belonged to his uncle and that he was in 
Surrey visiting friends. Identification and insurance was returned to 
NGUYEN he was advised to be more careful when driving, as to not 
get side swiped.
BY THE BOOK:
Driving on Laned Roadway: Motor Vehicle Act
s. 151 A driver who is driving a vehicle on a laned 
roadway
(a)  must not drive it from one lane to another 
when a broken line only exists between the lanes, 
unless the driver has ascertained that movement can be made 
with safety and will in no way affect the travel of another 
vehicle,
…
(c)    must not drive it from one lane to another without first 
signalling his or her intention to do so by hand and arm or 
approved mechanical device ...
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SAFETY QUESTIONS ON 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
PERMISSIBLE
R. v. Patrick, 2017 BCCA 57 
At 4:20 am the accused was 
stopped driving an SUV on a dimly 
lit residential street. The officer 
recognized the vehicle’s licence 
plate number and was aware that 
someone was attempting to register it in the  name 
of a person whose identity had been stolen. There 
were three other large men in the vehicle. The front 
passenger appeared passed out and was difficult to 
arouse. A rear seat passenger had two black eyes 
and a gash on his forehead. After identifying the 
three  passengers, the officer conducted background 
checks and determined they were known to be 
involved in the drug trade and violent. The accused 
had a dated criminal record which the officer did 
not consider significant. Three other uniformed 
officers arrived as backup. After being provided a 
phone by one of the occupants, the officer spoke to 
a person pretending to be the owner of the vehicle. 
The officer then returned to the  vehicle and told the 
accused she believed the vehicle  had been 
obtained fraudulently and that everyone in it was 
being detained for investigative purposes. 
The SUV occupants were asked to step out of the 
vehicle, one at a time. The passengers were 
cooperative and were patted down. When the 
accused was asked to get out, he turned to his right 
with his back to the officer and appeared to be 
fumbling with something. The officer directed the 
accused to show his hands but he did not comply. 
When a second request went ignored police 
entered the vehicle  and yelled at the accused to 
show his hands. He complied and exited the 
vehicle. As he did so, the officer noticed an oddly 
shaped, unnatural bulge in the area of his right 
shoulder under his jacket. The officer directed the 
accused to keep his hands where she could see 
them and asked him, “Do you have something 
on you?”. He said he did, patted his right shoulder 
and, when asked what he had, said it was a 
shotgun. 
A loaded, sawed-off shotgun was immediately 
retrieved from under the accused’s jacket. He was 
arrested for carrying a  concealed weapon, 
handcuffed, searched and advised of his right to 
counsel. He said he wanted to speak to a lawyer 
but was not provided access to one even though 
cellphones were available at the scene. The 
accused was then transported to the police station 
while the passengers were released at the scene. 
The accused was given an opportunity to 
speak with a  lawyer, some 40 minutes after 
the vehicle stop, following his booking 
procedure and a more thorough search in 
which a 9 mm bullet was found. The 
accused was charged with three  offences 
related to the discovery of the sawed-off 
shotgun. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
At trial, the accused conceded that the 
investigating officer had the requisite 
reasonable grounds to detain him at the 
roadside for investigative purposes and 
to conduct a protective pat-down search for safety 
by the time he was asked to step out of the vehicle. 
The accused, however, contended that the manner 
of the search - asking him a question instead of 
patting him down - exceeded the scope of a safety 
search. As for the implementation of his right to 
counsel, the accused submitted that he was entitled 
to speak to a lawyer at the roadside even though 
privacy could not be assured. 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the  two 
questions asked by the officer were a legitimate 
extension of the search power incident to 
investigative detention because these inquiries 
were motivated by a  safety  concern. In the Crown’s 
view, the police are allowed to ask a detainee 
questions like “Is there something I need to be 
worried about?” or “Do you have anything on 
you?” before conducting a  protective pat-down 
search. 
The judge found, among other things, that the 
questions the  officer asked the accused at the 
roadside and the  response those  questions elicited 
breached his s. 8 rights. The trial judge excluded all 
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of the evidence seized at the roadside  under s. 
24(2) including the shotgun. The accused was 
acquitted of all charges. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the 
trial judge erred in law in 
concluding  that the accused’s 
s.  8 Charter rights were 
violated during the roadside stop. In the Crown’s 
opinion, a police officer has the power to ask a 
detainee if they are  in possession of anything that 
may cause injury before embarking upon or in the 
course of conducting a permissible  pat-down 
search incident to a lawful investigative detention. 
And even though the officer’s question was framed 
in general terms, it was intended by the officer and 
understood by the accused to be a question about 
whether he was in possession of weapons. The 
inquiry was confined to the officer’s safety-based 
concerns and was not an attempt on her part to use 
the search power as a subterfuge for evidence 
gathering. The Crown sought a new trial on charges 
related to the discovery  of the sawed-off shotgun at 
the roadside.
The accused, on the other hand, submitted that the 
police were not entitled in any circumstances to 
ask questions preliminary to or in the  course of a 
permissible pat-down search. In his view, a search 
incident to an investigative detention is restricted to 
physical pat-downs of detained persons. He argued 
that any questions asked in this context necessarily 
exceeds the scope of the common law power 
police officers have  to conduct protective  searches 
incident to an investigative detention and result in a 
violation of s.  8. Furthermore, the  accused 
suggested that the questions asked were 
impermissibly broad and ran afoul of the  strictures 
governing police powers to conduct investigative 
detention searches. 
Search Incident to Investigative Detention
Justice Fitch, authoring the decision for the Court of 
Appeal, in assessing the scope of the power of 
police to search as an incident to an investigative 
detention, noted the following:
• The general duty  of officers to protect life may, 
in certain situations, give rise to the power to 
conduct a  pat-down search incident to an 
investigative detention. 
• To lawfully exercise this authority, the officer 
must believe on reasonable grounds that his or 
her own safety, or the  safety of others, is at 
risk. 
• The decision to search must also be 
reasonably necessary in light of the  totality of 
the circumstances. It cannot be justified upon 
mere intuition or on the basis of vague or non-
existent concerns for safety. 
• The search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner.
• The power to search incident to an 
investigative detention is circumscribed by its 
underlying rationale – the protection of police 
officers and others from harm that could have 
been avoided through a  minimally intrusive 
search. 
• The power to search incident to an 
investigative detention is not a license to 
search for evidence and must be distinguished 
from the power to search incidental to a lawful 
arrest.
• The power to conduct a  protective search 
incidental to a lawful investigative detention 
recognizes the unpredictable, dynamic and 
sometimes dangerous context in which the 
police are  obliged to discharge their public 
duties. 
• The risks are heightened when the police 
approach an occupied vehicle in which 
weapons may be concealed.
• The risks are magnified even further when a 
roadside stop occurs in darkness and the 
vehicle is occupied by a group of men, some 
of whom are known to have connections to 
the drug trade and a propensity for violence.
“[T]he power to search incident to a 
lawful investigative detention is not 
necessarily restricted to a physical 
pat-down of the person detained.”
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Asking Safety Related Questions
The Court of Appeal found the power to conduct a 
search incident to an investigative detention is not 
limited to a physical pat-down of a detainee. After 
reviewing several cases, Justice Fitch stated:
I take from these authorities the following 
points. First, the power to search incident to a 
lawful investigative detention is not necessarily 
restricted to a physical pat-down of the person 
detained. Second, whether the search was 
justified and conducted in a reasonable manner 
must be assessed in light of the rationale 
underlying the common law power itself – the 
prevention of avoidable harm through a brief 
and minimally intrusive search. Third, the 
public duties of police officers oblige them to 
interact with members of the public in 
potentially dangerous situations; they must be 
allowed reasonable latitude in determining 
how to conduct the search in the context of the 
particular case. ... As this case illustrates, 
detainees may be in possession of concealed, 
loaded firearms. Detainees may also be in 
possession of concealed sharp objects like 
knives or uncapped hypodermic needles that 
could seriously injure an officer conducting a 
pat-down search if no prior inquiry is made of 
the detainee about whether they are in 
possession of any such items. [para. 94]
And further:
As in the case of a search incident to arrest, an 
officer about to search a person pursuant to an 
investigative detention could reasonably 
conclude that it is necessary to make inquiries 
of that person before proceeding with a pat-
down search. To hold otherwise is to accept the 
proposition that the only recourse the police 
have in conducting a search pursuant to an 
investigative detention is to make physical 
contact with the detainee. The circumstances of 
this case illustrate the dangers associated with 
adopting a bright line rule restricting Mann-
style searches to physical pat-downs of a 
detainee. 
[The officer] did not know that a loaded firearm 
was being concealed by the [accused] when 
she asked her questions. Had [the officer] been 
constitutionally obliged to make only physical 
contact with the [accused] without any prior 
inquiry about what was being concealed, it is 
conceivable that the search could have caused 
the loaded, sawed-off shotgun to discharge, 
imperiling the lives of everyone present. I 
cannot accept that police officers and other 
members of the public at the scene of a 
detention are, in every case and regardless of 
the circumstances, constitutionally obliged to 
court this risk.
Requiring as a matter of constitutional principle 
that police officers be confined to a physical 
pat-down search of the detainee risks bringing 
about the very harm the common law power is 
designed to guard against. 
...
In my view, questioning a detainee about to be 
frisk searched as to whether they are in 
possession of anything that might cause the 
searching officer injury is minimally intrusive 
search. In some respects, it is less intrusive than 
a physical pat-down search. I would hold that 
narrowly tailored questions of this kind 
motivated solely by safety concerns are 
permissible. ... [A]sking a detainee whether 
they are in possession of anything that might 
cause injury to an officer about to execute a 
pat-down search constitutes a justifiable 
exercise of the powers associated with the duty 
of police officers to preserve the peace, prevent 
crime and protect life. That the search takes the 
form of minimally intrusive questioning as 
opposed to physical contact does not, standing 
alone, make the manner of the search 
unreasonable.
“Detainees may also be in possession of concealed sharp objects like knives or 
uncapped hypodermic needles that could seriously injure an officer conducting a pat-
down search if no prior inquiry is made of the detainee about whether they are in 
possession of any such items.”
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Nothing compels a detainee to answer such a 
question. It stands to reason, however, that the 
police will be afforded additional latitude in 
determining the manner in which the search 
needs to be conducted if the detainee declines 
to respond. [references omitted, paras. 98-103]
Whether or not a  response to a safety question is 
admissible  as evidence at the trial proper, since s. 
10(b) had not been provided, was left for another 
day. 
The Court of Appeal declined to consider if the 
open-ended question asked in this case by the 
officer was a justifiable exercise  of her common 
law powers, preferring to leave the resolution of 
this issue to a new trial. Since the trial judge erred 
in law in considering  whether the  accused’s s.  8 
rights were violated in the course of the  roadside 
stop, a new trial was ordered on the charges.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s note: There were other issues involved in 
this case but not discussed in this summary.
Note-able Quote
“Every thought-seed sown or allowed to fall into 
the mind and to take root there, produces its 
own, blossoming sooner or later into act, and 
bearing its own fruitage of opportunity and 
circumstance. Good thoughts bear good fruit, 
bad thoughts bad fruit.” - James Allen
CHANGE IN JEOPARDY 
REQUIRED SECOND CHANCE 
TO CONSULT COUNSEL
R. v. Moore, 2016 ONCA 964
 
The accused was involved in a road 
rage incident involving the driver of 
a van. Following  a verbal altercation, 
the van driver followed the accused’s 
car and cut him off. When the van 
driver got out of his vehicle and approached the 
accused, the accused initially  reversed and then 
drove forward striking the van driver. The accused 
was arrested for dangerous driving and spoke to 
duty  counsel. However, a police officer conducting 
a formal interview later told the accused that, in 
addition to the charge of dangerous driving causing 
bodily harm, he was also going to be charged with 
assault with a weapon. The accused responded 
several times “That can’t be right” and stated, “It 
wasn’t an assault.” The accused asked to contact his 
own lawyers and the interviewer attempted to 
contact the individuals named. In the meantime, 
while waiting for a call back from the accused’s 
counsel, the arresting officer told the  interviewer 
that the accused had agreed to, and did, speak to 
duty  counsel after his arrest. Upon receiving this 
information, the interviewer concluded that the 
accused had an opportunity to consult with 
counsel and continued with an interview. The 
accused provided a statement and he was charged 
with serious driving offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
While the judge acknowledged that the 
accused would have been entitled to a 
second opportunity  to speak to counsel 
had there  been a change in the jeopardy 
he was facing, he found that the charge of assault 
with a  weapon did not constitute a change in 
jeopardy. Both charges arose from the same 
circumstances, the accused was fully  aware of 
those circumstances, both offences carried the 
same maximum penalty and dangerous driving was 
a straight indictable offence while assault with a 
weapon was hybrid in nature. As well, even if there 
“[Q]uestioning a detainee about to be 
frisk searched as to whether they are in 
possession of anything that might 
cause the searching officer injury is 
minimally intrusive search. In some 
respects, it is less intrusive than a 
physical pat-down search. I would hold 
that narrowly tailored questions of this 
kind motivated solely by safety 
concerns are permissible.”
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was a s. 10(b) Charter breach, the  judge would 
have admitted the accused’s statement under s. 
24(2) anyways. The interviewer acted in good faith, 
the accused had repeatedly stated that he wanted 
to tell his story to the police and the outcome 
would not have been different had the accused 
been given a further opportunity to speak to his 
own lawyer. The accused was convicted of 
dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault 
with a weapon (motor vehicle).
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the  trial judge erred in 
failing to find that the police 
breached his Charter right 
under s. 10(b) and by not excluding the evidence of 
his formal police interview under s. 24(2). 
Right to Counsel 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge did 
err in determining whether the accused’s jeopardy 
had changed by focusing on the fact that the 
charges arose  from the same circumstances, that 
the offences carried the same maximum penalty 
and that the new charge was a hybrid offence:
Considered in the circumstances of this case, 
the assault with a weapon charge significantly 
increased the [accused’s] alleged moral 
blameworthiness in relation to the charge in 
that it required proof that he acted intentionally 
to harm the van driver, rather than simply that 
his driving constituted a marked departure from 
the norm. This, in turn, markedly increased the 
potential penalty that the [accused] faced. 
[para. 10]
As for whether the accused, who had received 
advice from duty counsel not to make a statement, 
would have continued with the  interview in any 
event was speculative. “The new charge of assault 
with a weapon was significantly different and 
carried more serious potential consequences than 
the original charge of dangerous driving causing 
bodily harm,” said the Court of Appeal. “Moreover, 
it is apparent from the accused's reaction to being 
informed of the new charge that he believed there 
was something amiss.” Thus, the police breached 
the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to 
afford him a second opportunity to speak to 
counsel.
As for whether the statement was admissible under 
s. 24(2), the Court of Appeal added this:
In our view, the admission of the evidence 
would have a negative impact on society’s 
confidence in the justice system. We say this 
with specific regard to the three Grant factors. 
First, in terms of the seriousness of the Charter-
infringing state conduct, depriving the 
[accused] of access to counsel in the face of his 
increased jeopardy was serious. Second, this 
deprivation had a serious impact on the 
protected interests of the [accused], namely the 
[accused’s] right to make a meaningful and 
informed choice of whether to speak to the 
police. Third, with respect to society’s interest 
in adjudicating the case on its merits, declining 
to admit the evidence does not undermine the 
ability of the prosecution to proceed. .... 
[T]here is no absolute rule of exclusion for 
Charter-infringing statements. However, as a 
matter of practice, courts have tended to 
exclude such statements on the ground that 
admission on balance would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. For the 
reasons that we have explained we consider 
that to be the case here. [para. 14]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
are set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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Leadership Through Crisis
The Westin Bayshore | Vancouver, BC
ConferenCe and Theme
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police in 
partnership with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 
are hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics discussed by 
world-renowned speakers.
The 2017 conference theme is “Leadership Through Crisis”. 
As members of the policing community our responsibility and 
obligation, regardless of position or rank, is to lead through 
crisis, large or small. Crisis in policing is unavoidable and it is the 
time when leadership is needed the most. This conference will 
provide delegates from the police community with insights into 
what is necessary to navigate through crisis and succeed. The 
Police Leadership Conference will bring together experts who 
will provide real-life accounts of the crisis they encountered 
and their path to leadership through dark, urgent or intensely 
difficult times. The carefully chosen list of keynote speakers will 
provide a first class opportunity at a first class venue to hear 
how they decided to take action, one step at a time and do what 
was right and not necessarily easiest.
LoCaTion of ConferenCe / 
aCCommodaTions
The Westin Bayshore
1601 Bayshore Drive, Vancouver, BC
2017 Police Leadership Conference Rate:  $195 plus 
taxes per night
Call: 1-800-WESTIN-1 or 604-682-3377
Email: bayshore.reservations@westin.com
Guestrooms held until March 7, 2017  
(prices are not guaranteed after this date)
regisTraTion fee
$450 + GST ($472.50) Prior to January 1, 2017
$475 + GST ($498.75) January 1, 2017 – Conference start
For more information regarding programming, 
registration or accommodations please visit the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police website at 
www.cacp.ca.  For those without internet access 
please call (613) 595-1101 for further assistance.
 
 @CaCp_aCCp
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PARKING METER NOT A PLACE 
FOR PURPOSE OF POSSESSING 
BREAK-IN INSTRUMENTS
R. v. Reid, 2017 BCCA 53
 
The accused was seen trying to pull 
coins from a parking meter. He was 
using a  tool –  a wire trimmer and a 
straw with a magnet in it. About a 
week later he was seen using a 
flattened piece  of metal again trying to get money 
from two parking meters. When arrested, he had in 
his possession a flat metal rod and a white straw 
about three inches in length. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
For the first offence, the accused pled 
guilty to s. 351(1) of the Criminal Code – 
possessing a  break-in instrument – which 
has a maximum sentence of 10 years. For 
the second offences he pled guilty to s. 352 – 
possessing instruments for breaking into coin 
operated devices – which has a maximum sentence 
of two years.  
A few years later, immigration authorities issued a 
removal order against the accused. Although he 
moved to Canada with his family when he was five 
years old and became a permanent resident, he 
never obtained his Canadian citizenship. Under s. 
36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA), permanent residents are  inadmissible on 
grounds of “serious criminality”. A conviction 
under s. 351 of the Criminal Code with its 10 year 
maximum sentence amounts to “ser ious 
criminality” and attracts the operation of s. 36(1) of 
IRPA while s. 352 with its maximum sentence of 
two years does not. He was subsequently detained 
and advised he would be removed from Canada.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed from his 
conviction under s. 351(1) of 
the Criminal Code because  of 
the application of s. 36(1) of 
IRPA to his status in Canada. The accused argued 
that the  differences in the legal elements of the 
Criminal Code provisions he pled guilty  to were 
never addressed and he was never told of the 
adverse immigration consequences flowing from a 
conviction under s. 351(1). In his view, he  was 
convicted under the wrong section of the Criminal 
Code.
Meaning of “Place”
Under s. 351(1) of the Criminal Code, the 
possession of the  instrument must be suitable for 
the purpose of breaking into any place, motor 
vehicle, vault or safe. “Place” is defined as 
meaning: a dwelling-house; a building  or structure 
or any part thereof, other than a  dwelling-house; a 
railway vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or a trailer; or a 
pen or an enclosure in which fur-bearing animals 
are kept in captivity for breeding or commercial 
purposes.
The Crown conceded that the accused could not in 
law have been properly convicted under s. 351(1) 
on the facts and that a “parking meter” was not a 
“place, motor vehicle, vault or safe”, but instead 
was a “coin-operated” device within the meaning 
of s. 352.
Justice Kirkpatrick, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal, agreed that a parking meter was not a 
“place”. “Having regard to the definition, it is in my 
opinion self-evident that ‘place’ does not include a 
BY THE BOOK:
Serious Criminality: IRPA
s. 36 (1) A permanent resident ... is inadmissible 
on grounds of serious criminality for
(a)  having been convicted in Canada of an 
offence under an Act of Parliament punishable 
by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or 
of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term 
of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;
…
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parking meter,” she said. “I agree with counsel that 
‘structure’ has historically been interpreted to mean 
something built up from component parts, 
permanent, and ‘of substantial size’.” 
As a result, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
accused’s appeal and directed a  verdict of 
acquittal.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NO NEED TO RESPOND UNLESS 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF        
s. 10(b) RIGHTS COMMUNICATED
R. v. Dunford, 2017 SKCA 1 
The accused was arrested by  police 
after he drove into and killed a flag 
person working in a construction 
zone. After the  collision occurred, the 
accused called 911 for assistance. 
When the police attended the scene, the accused 
was distraught but was able to produce his driver’s 
licence and answer questions without difficulty. No 
signs of alcohol or other impairment were 
observed. He was provided with information about 
his right to counsel and he said that he understood. 
When asked if he wished to call a lawyer, the 
accused said no. He was also given the  police 
caution and said that he understood this warning.
The accused was transported to the police station 
where  he was interviewed.  At the beginning of the 
interview, the arresting officer confirmed the 
accused’s right to counsel had been provided to 
him and asked if he wanted to speak with a lawyer. 
The officer then asked him if he wanted to talk to 
Legal Aid. The accused indicated that he  did not 
mind going without a lawyer and said he just 
wanted to “get it done”. During the interview the 
accused was calm and collected, nothing seemed 
out of the ordinary and he did not ask for 
clarification about anything. He did provide a 
statement that he wasn’t paying attention while 
driving. At the end of the interview, the accused 
raised the issue about what would happen to him. 
In response, the officer identified what in his view 
were potential penalties that the accused might 
face. The accused then expressed an interest in 
Legal Aid. A phone was provided, he spoke to duty 
counsel and refused to give any further statement. 
He was charged with criminal negligence causing 
death and dangerous driving causing death.
Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench
The accused applied to have his 
statement excluded as evidence 
because  he argued his s.  10(b) Charter 
rights had been breached. He submitted 
that the officer ought to have recognized he was 
distraught and that he did not understand his right 
to counsel. He also contended that he was not a 
Canadian citizen and was unfamiliar with the 
Canadian legal system. As well, he alleged that the 
Conversation Between Accused & Officer Before 
Interview Started
Officer: … You’ve been arrested and you’ve been read your 
rights uhm, did you want to contact a lawyer?
Accused:  I don’t know one, I need legal aid so …
Officer: You don’t know if  you need legal aid?
Accused:  Well, I don’t know of  a lawyer and I can’t afford one 
so I think I need legal aid.
Officer: Did you want to talk to legal aid, it’s completely up 
to you.
Accused:  That’s fine as I don’t mind going without.
Officer: Going without?
Accused:  Yeah, yeah. Just get it done.
Officer: Okay.
Accused:  I know I was in the wrong.
Officer:  Kay. Well if  you change your mind you can let me 
know. Uhm and I read you what was called a police 
caution. So basically anything you tell me can be 
used as evidence. Okay, do you remember me telling 
you that?
Accused:  Yes sir.
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combination of his initial discussion with the 
officer about not qualifying for Legal Aid, his 
subsequent talk with a Legal Aid lawyer and his 
silence with respect to any statement thereafter 
indicated he  wanted to speak with a lawyer from 
the outset. 
The judge found the accused’s statement was 
voluntary and that he understood the  right to 
counsel. In the judge’s view, there was nothing in 
the circumstances that would alert the officer that 
further information and explanation of those rights 
was required. The judge also found that any lack of 
understanding by the accused of his rights was 
never conveyed by him to the officer. The accused’s 
s. 10(b) rights had not been breached. He was 
convicted of dangerous driving causing death, 
sentenced to two years less a day and given a three 
year driving prohibition. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused contended, 
among other things, that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
that his s. 10(b) Charter rights 
had not been infringed. He argued that the officer 
who read him his rights and dealt with him during 
the interview ought to have recognized that he did 
not understand his right to counsel and warnings. 
Justice Ottenbreit, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
found the trial judge made no such error:
The police do not have an obligation to 
respond to a detainee’s misunderstanding of his 
rights or how to implement them if that 
misunderstanding is not communicated to the 
police or if there are no other indicators 
suggestive of a lack of comprehension. These 
indicators viewed objectively must signal 
confusion or misunderstanding. [references 
omitted, para. 27]
In this case, there was nothing in the  circumstances 
that should have alerted the officer that the accused 
did not understand his right to counsel. At both the 
scene of the  accident and at the police station, the 
accused indicated he did not want a lawyer. He 
understood the information provided and declined 
access to counsel. “Moreover, the  fact that [the 
accused] was willing to speak to a lawyer after he 
became aware of possible penalties does not 
compel a conclusion that he did not understand he 
could have the assistance of a lawyer either at the 
scene of the accident or at the beginning of the 
interview,” said Justice Ottenbreit. “It is entirely 
understandable that he decided to seek legal advice 
only  after learning of possible sanctions.” There was 
no indication that the accused was uncertain about 
his right to counsel or anything  that would require 
the officer to provide a further explanation to the 
accused about his rights. No Charter breach under 
s. 10(b) had been proven. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Whether you think you can or you think you 
can’t, you’re right.” - Henry Ford
“The police do not have an obligation to respond to a detainee’s misunderstanding of his 
rights or how to implement them if that misunderstanding is not communicated to the 
police or if there are no other indicators suggestive of a lack of comprehension. These 
indicators viewed objectively must signal confusion or misunderstanding.”
“[T]he fact that [the accused] was willing 
to speak to a lawyer after he became 
aware of possible penalties does not 
compel a conclusion that he did not 
understand he could have the assistance 
of a lawyer either at the scene of the 
accident or at the beginning of the 
interview.”
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Note-able Quote
“Don’t mistake activity with achievement.” - John 
Wooden
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Assessing Informer Information
“When ... the information to 
support the warrant comes almost 
entirely from a CI, the totality of 
the circumstances inquiry focuses 
on three questions. Does the material before the 
reviewing judge demonstrate that the CI’s 
information was compelling? Does the material 
demonstrate that the CI was credible?  And does the 
material demonstrate that the CI’s information was 
corroborated by a reliable independent source?  
The first question addresses the quality of the CI’s 
information.  For example, did he purport to have 
first-hand knowledge of events or was he reporting 
what he had been told by others? The second 
question examines the CI’s credibility.  For example, 
does he have a long record which includes crimes of 
dishonesty, or does he have a motive to falsely 
implicate the target of the search? The third 
question looks to the existence and quality of 
information independent of the CI that offers some 
assurance that the CI provided accurate 
information.   The answers to each of the questions 
are considered as a whole in determining whether 
the warrant was properly issued in the totality of 
the circumstances. For example, particularly strong 
corroboration may overcome apparent weaknesses 
in the CI’s credibility:  .” - Ontario Court of Appeal in R. 
v. Shivrattan, 2017 ONCA 23 at para. 27-28, references omitted.





   
    
  

   




 
 


       



 
 

        

 
 
 
 

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EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
10th Annual Intensive Course on Drafting 
and Reviewing Search Warrants         
March 2, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Optional Workshop (for Day One Registrants 
only): March 3, 2017 - In Person 
Click here.
Evidence in Criminal Investigations: The 
Latest Developments in Law and Practice      
March 31, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
6th National Conference on Aboriginal 
Criminal Justice Post-Gladue (Co-Presented 
with Aboriginal Legal Services) 
April 29, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
11th National Symposium on Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes         
May 26, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
October 20, 2017 - Abbotsford, BC - Click here.
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FLEEING ACCIDENT SCENE TO 
AVOID BEING FOUND IN 
STOLEN AUTO MEETS MENS REA 
TEST FOR HIT & RUN
R. v. Seipp, 2017 BCCA 54
After someone stole a car and other 
items during a break-in, the resident 
decided to dr ive around the 
neighbourhood in search of the 
stolen car. The victim saw the 
accused driving the car, caught up to it and tried to 
overtake it in a roundabout. The two vehicles 
collided and the accused fled the scene without 
providing either his name or address. The accused 
was charged with several offences related to the 
break-in, and hit and run for failing to stop and 
provide his name and address at the scene of an 
accident as required by s. 252 of the Criminal 
Code. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
During f inal submissions at the 
accused’s trial, his lawyer acknowledged 
the accused’s guilt on the hit and run 
charge and he was convicted. He was 
also convicted of possessing a  stolen vehicle, fraud 
and using a stolen debit card. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his hit 
and run conviction on the 
basis that his lawyer was 
i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e a n 
essential element of the hit and run charge under s. 
252(1)(b) of the Criminal Code required proof of 
“intent to escape criminal or civil liability.” In 
his view, his lawyer misapprehended the essential 
elements of the offence which deprived him of an 
opportunity to have the offence tried on its merits. 
Had his lawyer understood the elements and went 
to trial, there was a reasonable probability he 
would have been acquitted. The Crown, to the 
contrary, submitted that the accused was guilty of 
the offence and therefore he suffered no prejudice. 
s. 252(1)(b) of the Criminal Code
The accused argued that 
the proper interpretation 
of “escape civi l or 
criminal liability” under 
s.  252(1) is that the 
intent must relate to 
avoiding liability in 
connection with the 
cause of an accident rather than any liability arising 
from the general operation of a  motor vehicle. In 
this case, the accused testified that he fled the 
scene because he did not want to be found with a 
stolen vehicle. Since the trial judge concluded that 
his driving was not the cause of the accident, he 
did not leave to escape civil or criminal liability in 
relation it.
BY THE BOOK:
Failure to Stop at Scene of Accident: CCC
s. 252 (1) Every person commits an offence who 
has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, 
vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident 
with
(a) another person,
(b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
(c)  in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of 
another person,
and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to 
stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his 
or her name and address and, where any person has been 
injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.
(2)  In proceedings under subsection (1), evidence that an 
accused failed to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, 
his aircraft, as the case may be, offer assistance where any 
person has been injured or appears to require assistance and 
give his name and address is, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, proof of an intent to escape civil or criminal 
liability.
...
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The Crown submitted that the intention to escape 
civil or criminal liability must be related to or 
substantially connected to the accident. In the 
Crown’s view, the  accused fled the scene to evade 
liability  for driving a stolen car at the time of the 
accident. Although his manner of driving did not 
cause the accident, such that he could be held 
liable for the passenger’s injuries, his use of the 
stolen car was a factual cause of the accident. This, 
in the Crown’s opinion, was a sufficient link 
between the liability he sought to avoid and the 
collision to establish the necessary mens rea. 
In analyzing s. 252, Justice Bennett summarized the 
law as follows:
Section 252(2) requires a driver who is involved 
in an accident to: (i) stop, (ii) give their name 
and address, and (iii) offer assistance if a person 
appears injured or in need of assistance. A 
driver is required to complete all three steps. 
Proof of failure to perform any one of these 
three acts will trigger a rebuttable presumption 
with respect to the driver’s intent. The evidence 
need only raise a reasonable doubt that the 
driver did not have the requisite intent. 
Therefore, failure to perform any of the three 
requirements is sufficient to form the actus reus 
of the offence and trigger the presumption of 
intent to escape criminal or civil liability. The 
mens rea may be proved by the presumption of 
intent in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.
There are two approaches in the jurisprudence 
for what is meant by “intent to escape civil or 
criminal liability” and what amounts to 
“evidence to the contrary”. One approach 
limits the intent required to the intent to avoid 
the legal consequences of the accident itself; 
the other includes the course of conduct 
leading up to the accident. Neither approach 
includes the evasion of criminal conduct at 
large as meeting the intent requirement. 
[references omitted, paras. 30-32]
In deciding the meaning of the phrase “with intent 
to escape civil or criminal liability”, the Court of 
Appeal found it included the course  of conduct 
leading up to the accident:
The object of the Code offence is to provide a 
penal incentive for a driver who is involved in 
an accident, regardless of whether they are at 
fault, to remain at the scene, provide their 
name and address, and offer assistance if 
another person appears to be injured or in need 
of assistance. The liability a driver seeks to 
evade is not narrowly construed as solely 
arising from the consequences of the accident 
itself, but must also encompass offences 
connected to the driving, such as impaired 
driving, driving while suspended, criminal 
negligence, and dangerous driving.
Flight to avoid criminal liability for driving a 
vehicle knowing it was stolen also fits into the 
continuum of liability connected to the accident:
The legislation was clearly intended to provide 
penal consequences for those who avoid an 
investigation for impaired driving by fleeing the 
scene. It also intended to provide penal 
consequences to persons who remain at the 
scene but do not offer to assist injured persons, 
and to provide penal consequences for those 
who attempt to hide their identities by failing to 
leave a name and address. A driver who 
commits these acts to escape civil or criminal 
liability arising from their driving has the 
requisite mens rea. The liability contemplated 
in the section cannot be solely in relation to the 
cause of the accident, as the driver may not be 
at fault, but the driver is still required to comply 
with the legislation. I would adopt the test ... 
that “civil or criminal liability should be 
broadly interpreted to include any liability, civil 
or criminal, which might properly arise from 
the operation of the motor vehicle by the 
defendant at the time the accident takes 
“It seems to me that ... being involved in an 
accident and fleeing to evade liability for 
driving a stolen motor vehicle, like driving 
while one’s licence is suspended, or driving 
while impaired, is conduct and intent that 
is intended to be included in this 
legislation.”
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place” (emphasis added). [reference omitted, 
para. 46]
Here, the accused was charged with the actus reus 
of failing to give  his name and address. “[He] did 
not want to be identified as the  driver of the car, as 
he was knowingly in possession of a stolen 
automobile, and was driving it at the time he was 
involved in the accident,” said Justice Bennett. “His 
flight from the scene was to avoid criminal liability 
in connection with a vehicle he was driving at the 
time of the accident.” She continued:
It seems to me that ... being involved in an 
accident and fleeing to evade liability for 
driving a stolen motor vehicle, like driving 
while one’s licence is suspended, or driving 
while impaired, is conduct and intent that is 
intended to be included in this legislation. 
Being the driver of a stolen car when involved 
in an accident, and fleeing to avoid detection 
as the driver, is, in my view, sufficiently related 
to the event to be captured by the intent of the 
legislation. Fleeing to avoid arrest as the driver 
of a stolen vehicle after an accident is therefore 
not evidence to the contrary, but falls within 
the criminal liability contemplated by the 
section. [para. 49]
So, even if the accused’s explanation that he fled 
the scene to avoid being found in a stolen vehicle 
was accepted, the presumption of intent would not 
have been rebutted. Therefore, his lawyer did not 
err in admitting the elements of the s. 252 Criminal 
Code offence. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.onc.ca
INTENDED RECIPIENT OF 
ELECTRONIC MESSAGE DOES 
NOT INTERCEPT IT
R. v. Mills, 2017 NLCA 12
A police officer created a Hotmail 
account for a fictitious 14-year-old 
girl named “Leann”, together with a 
Facebook page and profile containing 
background in format ion. This 
included information that she was a  high school 
student along with a photo from the internet. About 
three  weeks later, the officer received a Facebook 
message from the accused (a 32-year-old man). 
Over a period of approximately three months, there 
was an exchange of emails. The officer used a 
public and commonly used screen shot program 
called “Snagit” to capture all the information on his 
computer screen during each communication with 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Night Time Warrant Execution
“Unlike warrants issued under the 
Criminal Code, there is no 
statutory presumption that 
warrants issued under s. 11 of the 
CDSA are to be executed before 9:00 p.m. unless 
night time execution is justified under s. 488 of the 
Criminal Code.  That does not mean that the time at 
which a warrant is executed may not factor into the 
reasonableness of the manner in which the warrant 
is executed. It means only that when considering the 
reasonableness of the manner in which a warrant 
issued under s. 11 of the CDSA was executed, the 
Criminal Code distinction between warrants 
executed before and after 9:00 p.m. has no 
application.” - Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Shivrattan, 
2017 ONCA 23 at para. 61.
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the accused. A meeting at a park was arranged and, 
when the accused showed up, he was arrested and 
subsequently charged with communicating via  a 
computer system for the purposes of committing 
sexual offences. 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The police were able to identify the 
documents produced by the  “Snagit” 
screen captures and testified that they 
were accurate.  The judge, however, 
went on to conclude that the accused’s s. 8 Charter 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure was breached because the police failed to 
meet the requirements under Part VI of the  Criminal 
Code  to obtain authorizations to intercept the 
electronic communications. In the judge’s view, the 
police were required to obtain an authorization 
under s. 184.2 of the  Criminal Code. The judge, 
however, nevertheless admitted the evidence under 
s. 24(2).
The accused was convicted of communicating by 
means of a computer with a person believed to be 
under the age of sixteen years for a  sexual purpose. 
He was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, 
which was reduced by two months to compensate 
for the Charter violation. He was also sentenced to 
one year probation and ordered to provide a 
sample of his DNA.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s sentence, submitting 
that the  trial judge erred in 
finding that Part VI of the 
Criminal Code applied in this case and therefore he 
improperly found a Charter breach upon which he 
reduced the sentence. In the Crown’s submission, 
Part VI deals with the “Invasion of Privacy”, which 
did not apply in this case.
Part VI Application
Justice Welsh, delivering the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, noted that ss. 184 and 184.2 only apply 
where  there is an “intercept”.  In this case, she 
concluded there was no intercept:
The definition of “Intercept” in section 183 
clarifies the various ways in which an 
interception may be made.  It does not provide 
a dictionary-style definition of the word.  
Section 183 states:
“Intercept” includes listen  to, record or 
acquire a communication or acquire the 
substance, meaning or purport thereof;
That language does not alter the ordinary 
meaning of an interception which requires the 
involvement of a third party.  Where there is 
direct communication between two people, the 
intended recipient cannot be characterized as 
having “intercepted” a communication meant 
for that person. 
Further, the fact, unknown to the sender, that 
the recipient is a police officer cannot change 
the nature of the communication or transform a 
receipt by the intended recipient into an 
interception.   Viewed from another perspective, 
if “Leann” had, in fact, been a fourteen year old 
girl, it could not be said that her receipt of the 
communications from [the accused] constituted 
an interception.  
Electronic communications in the modern 
world involve a degree of anonymity and easily 
permit either the sender or recipient of a 
message to g ive mis leading or fa l se 
information.  In this case, the recipient 
purported to be a fourteen year old girl while 
the sender purported to be a twenty-three year 
old male.  Neither was true. [paras. 12-15]
Since there was no intercept, Part VI of the Criminal 
Code  did not apply and no authorization under s. 
184.2 was required. 
“Where there is direct communication 
between two people, the intended 
recipient cannot be characterized as 
having “intercepted” a communication 
meant for that person.”
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Use of “Snagit”
The use of the Snagit computer software did not 
alter the conclusion that the officer did not 
intercept the accused’s communications. The Snagit 
program did not affect the manner in which the his 
communications came into the officer’s possession 
and the program was simply a means to retain a 
record of the communications.   “Making a copy of 
a received message, ei ther on paper or 
electronically, could not, on that basis, be 
characterized as an interception,” said Justice 
Welsh. “Making a record of a received electronic 
communication using a software program for that 
purpose does not constitute an interception of the 
communication.”
Other s. 8 Charter Breaches?
In this case, the Court of Appeal also found there 
was no alternative basis for finding a s. 8 Charter 
breach because the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages 
he sent to “Leann”:
... [The accused] was using electronic social 
media to communicate and share information 
with a person he did not know and whose 
identity he could not confirm.  On an objective 
a n a l y s i s , a s t h e s e n d e r o f s u c h 
communications, [the accused] must have 
known that he lost control over any expectation 
of confidentiality that he appears to have hoped 
would be exercised by the recipient of the 
messages.  He took a risk when he voluntarily 
communicated with someone he did not know, 
a person he was not in a position to trust.   Any 
subjective expectation of privacy [the accused] 
may have had was not objectively reasonable.  
In the absence of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, section 8 of the Charter was not 
engaged.
I ha s t en t o add t ha t t he na tu r e o f 
communications between [the accused] and 
“Leann”, which took place using social media 
such as Facebook, must be distinguished from 
communications in which there would, in fact, 
be a reasonable expectation of privacy.  For 
example, privacy could be expected if the 
recipient of a communication is the sender’s 
bank.  Such a communication is sent for a 
particular purpose, using a means of 
communication that is represented to be 
secure, that clearly engages objectively 
reasonable privacy interests. [paras. 23-24]
Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, there 
could be no s. 8 Charter infringement. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the two month 
sentence reduction was set aside and the sentence 
of 14 months imprisonment was affirmed.  
However, the additional two months imprisonment 
was stayed as requested by Crown.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POLICE ENTITLED TO ACCEPT 
DISPATCH INFO EVEN WITHOT 
INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION
R. v. Carelse-Brown, 2016 ONCA 943
Shortly before 7:00 pm, two police 
officers responded to a 911 dispatch 
call. The callers reported “a person 
with a gun” following an encounter 
they had with two occupants of a 
vehicle – whom they saw with handguns – at a  Tim 
Hortons coffee shop.  Dispatch indicated that the 
suspects – both light-skinned black males, under 24 
years of age, wearing dark baseball caps – had a 
firearm and were  in a silver four-door Dodge sedan 
bearing licence plate BMMH719. The location that 
the vehicle was travelling was provided and a 
“Making a copy of a received message, 
either on paper or electronically, could 
not, on that basis, be characterized as an 
interception. ... Making a record of a 
received electronic communication using a 
software program for that purpose does 
not constitute an interception of the 
communication.”
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subsequent licence plate query 
determined it was registered to 
a four-door silver Dodge AXT 
(believed to be a Dodge 
Avenger) belonging to a  rental 
company, but it was not flagged 
as a crime vehicle. The officers 
travelled to the area where the 
vehicle was reported to be in 
an attempt to intercept it.  As 
they drove, updated locations 
for the  Dodge were given 
because  the 911 callers were 
following it. At one point, the 
911 callers reported that the 
suspect vehicle was pulling into an underground 
parking area. Shortly after that, the callers indicated 
that they could see police  officers and said they 
would wait at the intersection for the them.    
The officers then saw a silver Dodge sedan driving 
with a  matching licence  plate. The police followed 
the Dodge, estimating its speed to be about 60 kmh 
in a 40 kmh zone, and then pulled it over. The 
officers initiated a “high risk takedown” – an arrest 
at gunpoint – and ordered the driver (a young black 
male with a medium to light complexion) to exit 
with his hands up and he was taken into custody.  
The accused (a black male, with a light to medium 
complexion, in his twenties) was the front seat 
passenger and was ordered out with his hands up. 
He was told to lie face  down on the ground with 
his hands to his sides. He was handcuffed and told 
he was under arrest for possessing a firearm. He 
was searched and police found two baggies of 
marijuana weighing 0.83 grams in his coin pocket. 
They also found more than one thousand dollars in 
cash, folded into bundles, in this front right pocket, 
and more  cash and a cellphone in his left front 
pocket. The accused was then arrested for 
possessing marijuana and read his rights to 
counsel. A police dog searched the area but did not 
find any firearms. The accused was taken to the 
police station where he was strip searched for 
safety reasons since he was to be held with other 
prisoners pending a show cause hearing.  During 
this search, the police discovered 25.3 grams of 
cocaine in his underwear. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The arresting officer – a 22 year veteran 
– testified that speaking to the 911 
callers before intercepting the suspect 
vehicle was not an option because the 
two occupants of the car were  reportedly in 
possession of firearms.  As well, he said that he had 
responded to well over 100 gun calls and had been 
shot at twice.  He said he formed the intention to 
arrest the occupants of the Dodge before he made 
observations about them. He further testified that 
he did not detain the accused to further his 
investigation but, rather, placed him under arrest 
knowing that allowed him to search the accused’s 
pockets.  He also stated that he understood the 
difference between investigative detention and 
arrest and that an arrest would be subject to greater 
judicial scrutiny. As for his search, the officer said 
he was looking for “anything in relation to 
firearms”, including ammunition, a magazine or a 
handgun.  In his view, a pat-down search would 
have been insufficient because the 911 callers had 
mentioned that the  Dodge sedan had been seen to 
pull into an underground parking garage and that 
the callers had lost sight of the vehicle, so the 
occupants of the Dodge could have discarded 
firearms while in the parking garage.  
The accused argued that while the police had 
grounds for an investigative detention, they went 
too far when they arrested him and searched his 
pockets.  He asserted that the police  were only 
entitled to conduct a pat-down search for safety 
purposes and were not entitled to conduct the 
more intrusive search which led to finding the 
marijuana and the money, which then led to the 
arrest on drug charges and to the strip search and 
discovery of cocaine in the accused’s underwear. In 
the accused’s opinion, he was arbitrarily detained 
and unreasonably searched, thus the evidence 
should be excluded under s. 24(2) for breaches of 
ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter. 
The judge rejected the accused’s assertion, instead 
finding the  police had sufficient objective 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.  
The judge ruled that s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
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Code  provided the police with the power of arrest. 
Not only did the arresting officer personally believe 
he had reasonable and probable grounds to make 
the arrest (as conceded by the accused) but his 
grounds were also objectively established. The 
judge noted that a police officer is entitled to take 
into account information that they receive from a 
po l i ce d i spa tche r, even i f they canno t 
independently  confirm it. And even though the 
officers could have conducted further investigation, 
it did not mean that they were  required to do more 
before arresting  the accused in a situation that 
required them to act. Since there were no Charter 
breaches, there was no basis upon which to 
exclude the evidence and, even if there was a 
breach, the judge would have admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and was sentenced to 21 months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ probation. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
tha t the ar res t ing o f f icer 
objectively had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest. Without the 
required reasonable grounds, the police would be 
limited to a pat-down search incident to an 
investigative detention and the evidence should be 
excluded under s. 24(2).
Justice Gillese, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
refused to interfere with the trial judge’s 
determination that the police objectively had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused for unlawful possession of a firearm. “For 
an arrest under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to 
be lawful: (1) the arresting  officer must personally 
believe that he or she has reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the arrest; and (2) it must be 
objectively established that those reasonable and 
probable grounds existed,” said Justice Gillese. In 
this case, the following  was sufficient to objectively 
provide reasonable and probable grounds such that 
a reasonable person, standing in the arresting 
officer’s shoes, would have believed that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed to make 
the arrest: 
• The 911 callers had recently encountered the 
occupants of the suspect vehicle at a nearby 
Tim Hortons coffee shop and dispatch 
reported that both of the occupants of the 
suspect vehicle had handguns; 
• The 911 callers had identified themselves by 
giving their first names to the police 
dispatcher;  
• The 911 callers gave specific  and detailed 
information about the  vehicle  and its 
occupants, and behaved in an open and 
helpful way, actively assisting the police in 
locating the suspect vehicle, by following it 
and reporting on its movements;  
• The 911 callers offered to stop and meet the 
police at a specified intersection;
• When police first encountered the suspect 
vehicle, it was being driven at a high rate of 
speed – 60 km/h on a residential street with a 
speed limit of 40 km/h;  
• The colour, make and type of the suspect 
vehicle; the  vehicle’s licence plate; the 
vehicle’s location as it moved about; and the 
number and description of its occupants had 
been confirmed.  
• Everything that the officers saw was consistent 
with the information that the 911 callers had 
given and there was no reason to discount that 
information.  Based on this information, the 
officers had every reason to believe that the 
occupants of the suspect vehicle were in 
possession of handguns and no reason to 
doubt the bona fides of the callers.  
“[F]or an arrest under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to be lawful: (1) the arresting 
officer must personally believe that he or she has reasonable and probable grounds to 
make the arrest; and (2) it must be objectively established that those reasonable and 
probable grounds existed.”
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The Court of Appeal opined that not only were the 
police justified in acting on the information they 
had, they would have been derelict in their duty 
had they not acted on it. Nor were the police 
limited to an investigative detention because they 
had not taken steps to confirm the 911 callers’ 
information:
This was a dynamic, dangerous and rapidly 
changing situation involving a serious threat to 
public and officer safety.  Only about ten 
minutes elapsed from the time that the 911 call 
was first made, in which the callers alerted the 
police to their encounter with two men bearing 
handguns, to the time of the [accused’s] arrest – 
an arrest that took place next to the car in 
which he had been a passenger and which had 
been speeding through a residential area in 
Toronto.  ... [The arresting officer] made his 
decision to arrest after taking into account all of 
the available information.   To this I would add 
that the court has not been pointed to any 
information which [the arresting officer] is said 
to have disregarded and I see none on my 
review of the record. [para. 48]
The police are not required to interview a 
complainant in every case of a  911 call nor are 
they obligated to undertake  additional investigative 
steps to test a 911 report of ongoing crime before 
they are entitled to take action in reliance on that 
call. In this case, “both occupants of a speeding car 
had been very recently seen with handguns and 
there  was every reason to believe, at the time the 
car was stopped, that both men in the car had 
handguns.” The question to ask here is not whether 
the arresting officer did not simply conduct an 
investigative detention, but instead whether the 
arrest was lawful. The arresting officer’s decision to 
make the “arrest was a good-faith choice, 
objectively supported by the facts available  to him 
at the time of arrest.”   The police had reasonable 
and probable  grounds to stop a speeding car and 
arrest its two occupants based on the 911 gun call 
and were not limited to an investigative detention. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CANADA’s TOP OFFENCES IN 
ADULT CRIMINAL COURT
In a recently  released report, Statistics Canada 
identified the top offences that were concluded in 
adult criminal court. In 2014/2015 there were 328, 
028 cases completed for a total of 992,635 charges 
under the  Criminal Code  and other federal statutes. 
The five types of offences outlines below accounted 
for nearly half (48%) of all completed cases.  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Fentanyl
“The classic meaning of “perdition” 
is a state of eternal punishment 
and damnation into which a sinful 
and unpenitent person passes, 
after death. The modern usage is more secular in 
nature, and suggests perdition is a place of utter 
disaster, ruin, or destruction. Where the illicit use of 
fentanyl is concerned, perdition is precisely the 
correct term for the ultimate destination of 
purveyors and users of this substance.” - 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench in R. v. Fyfe, 2017 
SKQB 23 at paras. 1-2.





   
    
  

   




 
 


       



 
 

        

 
 
 
 


         

 
 

    

        

 
 
        


 
 
 
 



   
      

 


        

        

       



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CASES COMPLETED & OUTCOME
Type Number Guilty Stay/
Withdrawn
Acquitted
Theft 34,001 61% 37% 1%
Impaired driving 33,121 79% 17% 4%
Fail to comply with 
court order
31,544 68% 29% 2%
Common assault 29,867 47% 46% 6%
Breach of 
probation
29,626 80% 18% 2%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2014/2015”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X, released on February 21, 2017.
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ON-DUTY DEATHS UNCHANGED
The number of on-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada for 2016 remained 
the same as the previous year. In 
2016 three  peace officers lost their 
lives on the job as reported by the 
Officer Down Memorial Page. 
Since 2007, 15 officers have lost their lives to 
automobile accidents. Circumstances involving 
vehicles, including automobile accidents (15), 
vehicular assault (4) and being  struck by  a vehicle 
(2), posed the greatest risk  to officers over the last 
decade. These deaths account for half (50%) of all 
on-duty deaths, which is much higher than the next 
leading cause of gunfire (26%) in the same 10 year 
period. On average, four officer have lost their lives 
every year during the last decade, while 2010 had 
the most deaths at seven during that same period. 
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Constable	Thierry	Leroux
Service	de	Police	de	Lac	Simon,	QC
End	of	Watch:	February	13,	2016
Cause	of	Death:	Gunfire
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Constable	Sarah	Beckett
Royal	Canadian	Mounted	Police,	BC
End	of	Watch:	April	5,	2016
Cause	of	Death:	Automobile	Accident
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2016 Average Tour: 17 years 6 months
2016 Average Age: 36
2016 Deaths by Gender: female - 1
    male - 2
2016 Deaths by Province:
✴ British Columbia - 1
✴ Quebec - 2
Constable	Jacques	Ostigny
Sûreté	du	Québec,	QC
End	of	Watch:	September	21,	2016
Cause	of	Death:	Heart	Attack
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2016 Deaths by Cause:
✴ gunfire - 1
✴ heart attack - 1
✴ automobile accident - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 6
✴ male - 36
“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not 
Forget Them.”
Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed February 25, 2017]
2016 ROLL OF HONOUR
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Total
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 15
Drowned 1 1 2
Gunfire 1 2 3 1 1 3 11
Heart attack 1 1 1 3
Natural disaster 2 2
Stabbed 1 1
Struck by vehicle 1 1 2
Training accident 1 1
Vehicular assault 1 2 1 4
Total 3 3 5 6 5 3 7 4 2 4 42
Female 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6
Male 2 3 4 5 4 3 6 3 2 4 36
PEACE OFFICER ASSAULTS
According to a Statistics Canada report, “Police-
reported crime statistics in Canada, 2015,” the 
number of assaulting a police  officer offences 
increased by 278 (+3%) from 2014 to 2015. In 
2015 there were 9,835 assault police officer 
offences compared to 9,557 the previous year. 
However, from 2005 to 2015, the assault against 
police officer rate dropped by 7%. 
For other assaults in 2015, there were:
• 156,688 reports of common assault (level 1).
➡ rate increase of 1% from 2014.
• 47,119 assaults with a weapon or bodily harm 
(level 2).
➡  rate increase of 4% from 2014.
• 3,286 offences of aggravated assault (level 3). 
➡ effectively a 0% rate change from 2014.
14%
86%
On-Duty Deaths 2006-2015 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2015”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 20, 2016.
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U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2016 2015
911 related illness 3 8
Accidental - 2
Aircraft accident 1 1
Animal Related 1 -
Assault 3 3
Automobile accident 23 27
Bomb - 6
Drowned 2 1
Duty related illness 1 2
Fall 1 1
Gunfire 63 39
Gunfire (accidental) 2 2
Heart attack 8 17
Motorcycle accident 7 3
Stabbed 1 -
Struck by Train 1 -
Struck by vehicle 9 4
Vehicle pursuit 4 5
Vehicular assault 12 8
Weather/Natural Disaster - 1
Total 142 130
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2007-2016)
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Total
Deaths 142 130 146 125 139 181 177 140 162 204 1546
Avg. age 41 41 41 43 42 42 42 40 40 40
Avg. tour 13 yrs.
2 mos.
12 yrs.
4 mos.
13 yrs.
8 mos.
14 yrs.
9 mos.
12 yrs.
9 mos.
13 yrs.
8 mos.
12 yrs.
1 mos.
11 yrs.
11 mos.
12 yrs.
1 mos.
11 yrs.
5 mos.
Female 6 11 5 8 12 12 10 3 16 9 92
Male 136 119 141 117 127 169 167 137 146 195 1454
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE
During 2016 the U.S. lost 142 
peace officers, up 12 deaths 
from 2015. The top cause of 
death was gunfire (63) followed 
by automobile accidents (23), 
vehicular assault (12), being 
struck by vehicle (9), heart attack 
(8) and motorcycle accident (7).  
Texas lost the most officers in 2016 at 19 - followed by California 
(11), Louisiana (9), Georgia (8), Michigan (6), Tennessee (6), the 
U.S. Government (6), Florida 
(5) , Iowa (5) , Ohio (5) , 
Colorado (4),  Illinois (4), New 
York (4), Pennsylvania (4), and 
Puerto Rico (4). The average 
age  of deceased officers was 
41 years while the average 
tour of duty was 13 years and 
two months. Men accounted 
for 96% of U.S. officer deaths 
while women made up 4%. 
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php 
[accessed February 25, 2017]
“It Is Not How These Officers 
Died  That Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
Male 96%
Female 4%
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DID YOU KNOW ... 
... that BC’s Crown Counsel Policy  Manual directs 
the prosecutor to notify, in writing, the senior 
officer in charge of a police department when a 
judge makes an adverse finding concerning a 
police officer’s reliability or credibility in court?
Policy Code POL 1.1 of the manual states:
“Where a member of the judiciary makes an 
adverse finding on the court record about the 
reliability of the evidence given by, or the 
credibility of, a peace  officer short of an allegation 
of perjury, Crown Counsel should provide written 
notification of such finding to the senior officer in 
charge, or equivalent, of the officer’s agency. The 
notification should include the following: 
1. The police agency file and court file number; 
2. The date of the officer’s testimony; 
3. The date and nature of the adverse finding; 
4. The judge or justice who made the finding; 
and 
5. A covering memo briefly outlining the matter 
sufficient to facilitate ordering transcripts or 
other reasonable  steps by the  officer in 
charge. 
Crown Counsel’s role in this process is to notify 
the senior officer in charge of the judicial finding, 
rather than to offer an opinion regarding the 
judicial finding.” 
For the purpose of this policy, the term “peace 
officer” includes police  officers and any law 
enforcement personnel who have the  powers of a 
peace officer, such as Corrections Officers, 
Conservation Officers, Sheriffs, Youth Probation 
Officers, Canadian Border Services Agency 
Officers, Canadian Armed Forces Police, Fisheries 
Officers and By-Law Enforcement Officers.
The Public Prosecution Service of Canada  has a 
similar provision in its Deskbook – 3.14 Testimony 
of Police  Officers and Police Civilian Agents – 
which states:
“Where a court makes a finding or where it can be 
reasonably inferred from judicial comments that 
misleading or inaccurate evidence has been 
intentionally  given by a police witness, Crown 
counsel must bring it to the attention of their 
supervisor or manager in writing so that the 
matter will be referred to the police for possible 
investigation. If Crown counsel otherwise  has a 
compelling basis for believing that inaccurate 
testimony has been intentionally given by a police 
witness, they must bring it to the attention of their 
supervisor or manager, and they must notify 
defence and the  court. For example, where a 
police officer had testified at trial that the 
voluntary statement evidence he was giving the 
court were the exact words of the defendant. In 
fact, the  police officer later indicated that he had 
reconstructed his notes. In this situation, Crown 
counsel must inform the team leader, Deputy 
Chief Federal Prosecutor or Chief Federal 
Prosecutor and defence counsel and put the 
witness back on the stand to explain himself.”
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